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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT NEW YORK 
------------------------------------------------------------------------X  
 
In re:       
 
THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERS’ INSTITUTE, et al.,  Case No. 11-22820 (RDD) 
 
 




MEMORANDUM OF LAW (I) IN SUPPORT OF CONFIRMATION OF THE DEBTORS’ AND 
COMMITTEE’S FIRST AMENDED JOINT PLAN OF REORGANIZATION AND (II) IN 
REPLY TO VARIOUS OBJECTIONS FILED BY INSURERS, UNIMPAIRED CREDITORS 
AND THE CORPORATION OF THE CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF SEATTLE 
 
  The Christian Brothers’ Institute and The Christian Brothers of Ireland Inc., the 
debtors and debtors-in-possession (the "Debtors"), through their undersigned counsel, respectfully 
submit this memorandum of law in support of the issuance and entry of an order pursuant to section 
1129 of the Bankruptcy Code, confirming the Debtors’ and Committee’s first amended joint plan of 
reorganization, dated December 6, 2013 (the "Plan").  As will be demonstrated below and in the 
accompanying affidavit of Kevin Griffith (the "Griffith Affidavit" or "Griff Aff."), as well as the 
certification of ballots required by the local bankruptcy rules, all of the confirmation requirements set 
forth in section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code have been satisfied and consequently, the Court should 
confirm the Plan. 
 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
  By order, dated December 10, 2013 (the "Disclosure Statement Order"), this Court 
approved the first amended joint disclosure statement, dated December 6, 2013 (the "Disclosure 
Statement") as containing "adequate information" as that term is defined in §1125 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and authorized the Debtor to solicit for acceptances or rejections of the Plan by sending the 
Disclosure Statement and Plan with an appropriate ballot to all creditors and other parties-in-interest.  
The Court further scheduled a hearing to consider confirmation of the Plan for January 9, 2014.  The 
11-22820-rdd    Doc 646    Filed 01/06/14    Entered 01/06/14 12:44:26    Main Document  
    Pg 1 of 32
 {Client/001718/BANK376/00718791.DOCX;6 } 2 
Debtors have complied with the Disclosure Statement Order and mailed the solicitation package as 
well as other notices required by the Disclosure Statement Order to approximately 600 creditors and 
parties-in-interest.  The Plan is the result of a collaborative effort between the Debtors, the 
Committee, and Providence Washington Insurance Company (“PW”).  The Debtors, the Committee, 
and PW were involved in numerous plan mediation sessions and settlement conferences under the 
supervision of the Honorable Elizabeth S. Stong, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern 
District of New York. 
  The plan mediation involved numerous issues, including, without limitation, the 
following issues:  (i) the estimated monetary value of the sexual abuse claims, taking into 
consideration a variety of factors, including numerous state statutes of limitation; (ii) insurance 
coverage issues; (iii) arriving at a fair process to deal with numerous claims filed by Canadian abuse 
survivors, in view of the winding down of Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada (“CBIC”) and the 
distributions received in the CBIC winding down by certain Canadian claimants who also filed 
claims in the Debtors’ cases; (iv) Participating Party issues, including addressing the significant 
retirement and support claims asserted by the Debtors’ brothers; and (v) addressing a means by which 
the Plan would not impact the rights of abuse survivors to pursue claims against joint tortfeasors and 
the like.   
  Consistent with §1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Plan classifies all Claims1 into 
ten (10) Classes, four of which are unimpaired and deemed to have accepted the Plan; two of which 
are deemed to have rejected the Plan; and four of which are entitled to vote for or against the Plan. 
  Under the terms of the Plan each of Classes 4, 5, 6 and 8 (the "Voting Classes") are 
impaired under section 1124 of the Bankruptcy Code and, accordingly, are entitled to vote for or 
against the Plan.  As such, the Debtors solicited acceptances or rejections of the Plan from the 
holders of Claims in the Voting Classes.  As set forth in the certification of ballots submitted by the 
                     
    1 All capitalized terms not defined herein have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the Plan. 
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Claims Agent in compliance with Local Bankruptcy Rule 3018-1, each of the Voting Classes other 
than Classes 5 and 6, have accepted the Plan by the requisite statutory majorities in accordance with 
section 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code.  In fact, the Voting Classes, which actually cast ballots 
overwhelmingly voted in favor of the Plan.2 
  In the event that the holders of Claims in Classes 9 and 10 which are deemed to have 
rejected the Plan, pursuant to section 1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code notwithstanding such Classes’ 
support or non-objection to the Plan, the Debtors intend to confirm the Plan pursuant to section 
1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Similarly, the Debtors intend to utilize section 1129(b) to confirm 
the Plan with respect to Classes 5 and 6, which Classes did not cast a single ballot for or against the 
Plan.  
  Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the Plan can be confirmed 
notwithstanding the fact that an impaired class has failed to accept the Plan and thus, section 
1129(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code has not been satisfied.  Section 1129(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy 
Code states that if all of the applicable requirements of section 1129(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, other 
than section 1129(a)(8) are satisfied, the court shall confirm the Plan if such Plan does not 
discriminate unfairly and is "fair and equitable" with respect to the Class which has rejected the Plan 
or which is deemed to have rejected the Plan. 
  The Notice mailed to all Creditors’ with the Disclosure Statement Order further 
provided that objections to confirmation of the Plan were to be filed on or before January 3, 2013.  
The following objections were filed to confirmation of the Plan: (i) objection of Pacific Indemnity 
Company (“Pacific”) (ECF Doc. No. 630), (ii) joinder of Interstate Fire & Casualty Company to 
objection of Pacific (ECF Doc. No. 632), (iii) joinder of Maryland Casualty Company to objection of 
Pacific (ECF Doc. No. 638), (iv) joinder of Hanover Insurance Company and Massachusetts Bay 
Insurance Company to objection of Pacific (ECF Doc. No. 640), (v) limited objection of Aetna Inc. 
                     
2 Not a single Class 4 Sexual Abuse Claim voted against the Plan.  Class 5 which consists of Fraud Claims only 
contained 5 Claimholders.  No ballots were cast by Class 5 Claimholders.  Class 6 which consists of Physical Abuse 
Claims contained approximately 5 Claimholders.  No ballots were cast by Class 6 Claimholders. 
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and certain affiliates (ECF Doc. No. 635), (vi) objection of Canandaigua National Bank and Trust 
(ECF Doc. No. 634), and (vii) objection of the Corporation of the Catholic Archbishop of Seattle 
(ECF Doc. No. 637).   
 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
  The Debtors refer this Court to the Griffith Affidavit and the Certification of Ballots, 
which are incorporated herein by reference, for the recitation of the pertinent facts. 
 ARGUMENT 
  Applicable case law dictates that, in considering confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization, a court should be guided by two important considerations.  First, courts have an 
independent duty to ensure that a plan of reorganization satisfies each of the requirements of section 
1129 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See, e.g., Williams v. Hibernia National Bank (In re Williams), 850 
F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1988); In re 8315 Fourth Ave. Corp., 172 B.R. 725 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).  
Second, creditor democracy is integral to a chapter 11 case and should be afforded substantial 
deference in the absence of a clear impediment to plan confirmation.  See, Matter of Mother 
Hubbard, Inc., 152 B.R. 189, 195 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993).  In a related context, the United 
States Supreme Court has emphasized that creditors should be permitted to decide what plan 
treatment is in their best interest.  See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 
(1988).   
  As set forth below, the Plan satisfies each of the requirements for confirmation under 
the Bankruptcy Code, and notwithstanding the limited objections filed by the Debtors’ liability 
insurers and unimpaired creditors, the Court should confirm the Plan.  In addition, as the certification 
of ballots demonstrates, each of the Voting Classes who actually cast ballots by overwhelming 
majorities voted to accept the Plan. 
 I. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
  Section 1129(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Under section 1129(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan must "comply with the 
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applicable provisions of the [Bankruptcy Code]". 
  The legislative history of section 1129(a)(1) explains that this provision refers to the 
provisions of sections 1122 and 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code governing the classification of claims 
and the contents of a plan.  H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1977).  In re 
Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom; Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).  
As demonstrated below, the Plan complies with the requirements of both sections 1122 and 1123 of 
the Bankruptcy Code. 
  A. The Plan Satisfies the Classification 
   Requirements of Section 1122(a)       
   
  Section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan may place a claim or 
interest in a particular class if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the other claims or 
interest of such class.  Under section 1122(a), the relevant inquiry is whether all claims of a class 
have substantially similar legal rights against the debtor.  A plan proponent is afforded significant 
flexibility in classifying claims under section 1122(a) if there is a reasonable basis for the 
classification scheme and if all claims within a particular class are substantially similar.  See, e.g., In 
re Chateaugay Corp., 89 F.3d 942, 949-950 (2d Cir. 1996).  Courts have also held that the 
Bankruptcy Code prohibits the placement of dissimilar claims in a single class.  Section 1122 of the 
Bankruptcy Code does not require a plan proponent to place all claims which share similar attributes 
in a single class if a reasonable basis exists for separate classification.  See, e.g., In re Jersey City 
Medical Center, 817 F.2d 1055, 1060 (3rd Cir. 1987); In re Boston Post Road, Ltd., Partnership, 21 
F.3d 477, 483 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 109, 115 S.Ct. 897 (1995); In re Kliegl Bros. 
Universal Elec. Stage Lighting Co., Inc., 149 B.R. 306 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
  Under the Plan, the classification scheme is reasonable and necessary to implement 
the Plan.  All Claims within each Class are substantially similar to the other Claims.  Griff Aff. ¶10.  
Specifically, the Class 4 sexual abuse claims while unsecured, are substantially different in nature 
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than ordinary unsecured claims classified in Class 8 of the Plan, Class 5 Fraud Claims (as these 
Claimholders have already obtained monies on account of their injuries), and Class 6 Physical Abuse 
Claims (which Claims are clearly barred by statute of limitations and only receiving $500 under the 
Plan). 
  Accordingly, the Plan satisfies section 1122(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  B. The Plan Satisfies Each of the 
   Requirements Contained in Sections 
   1123(a)(1)-(7) of the Bankruptcy Code 
   
  Section 1123(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contains eight requirements that must be 
included in every chapter 11 plan.  The Plan fully complies with each such requirement.3 
  1. Section 1123(a)(1) 
  Section 1123(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a Plan designate classes of 
claims, other than claims of a kind specified in sections 507(a)(2), 507(a)(3) or 507(a)(8) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
  In accordance with this provision, Section V of the Plan adequately and properly 
classifies all Claims and accordingly, satisfies the requirements of Section 1123(a)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Griff Aff. ¶10.   
  2. Section 1123(a)(2) 
  Section 1123(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a Plan specify any class of 
claims or interests that is not impaired under a plan.  In accordance with this provision, Section VI of 
the Plan identifies Classes 1, 2, 3 and 7 as not being impaired under the Plan. 
  3. Section 1123(a)(3) 
  Section 1123(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a Plan "specify the treatment 
of any class of claims or interests that is impaired under the Plan".  In accordance with this provision, 
Section VII of the Plan specifies that treatment of each impaired Class of Claims. 
                     
3 Section 1123(a)(8) only applies in individual chapter 11 cases and as such is not applicable herein. 
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 Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. 
  4. Section 1123(a)(4) 
  Section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a Plan to provide the same 
treatment for each claim or interest of a particular class, unless the holder of the claim or interest 
agrees to less favorable treatment of such particular claim or interest.  With respect to each Class of 
Claims under the Plan, the Plan provides the same treatment for each Claim in such Class.  Griff Aff. 
¶10.  Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  5. Section 1123(a)(5) 
  Section 1123(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code requires a Plan to provide adequate means 
for the implementation of the Plan.  Sections IX, X, and XI of the Plan provide adequate means for 
implementation of the Plan.  Griff Aff. ¶10.  Specifically, the Plan creates a trust to pay sexual abuse 
claims and provides for an allocation protocol to distribute monies that have been contributed to the 
Trust. In addition, the Plan provides that the Debtors’ interests under various liability insurance 
policies are assigned to the Trust and provides a mechanism to preserve the benefit of the insurance 
policies.  The Plan also contains various non-monetary commitments which are designed to assist in 
the healing process and to further reduce the likelihood of sexual abuse in the future.   
  Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(5) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
  6. Section 1123(a)(6) 
  Section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a Plan shall "provide for the 
inclusion in the charter of the debtor. . . of a provision prohibiting the issuance of non-voting equity 
securities".  As set forth in the Griffith Affidavit, this section does not apply as the Debtors’ are 
not-for-profit corporations which do not have non-voting equity securities.  Accordingly, the 
requirements of section 1123(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code have been satisfied by the Plan. 
  7. Section 1123(a)(7) 
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  Section 1123(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a chapter 11 plan shall: 
"contain only provisions that are consistent with the interests of 
creditors and equity security holders and with public policy with 
respect to the manner of selection of any officer, director, or trustee 
under the Plan and any successor to such officer, director or trustee". 
  In accordance with section 1123(a)(7), the Plan provides that the Debtors’ trustees 
shall continue in their present form after the Effective Date.  In addition, Section XVII of the Plan 
also contains several non-monetary commitments which will further ensure that sexual abuse will not 
occur in the future or if does occur it will be dealt with in an appropriate manner.  The Debtors’ 
submit that such provisions comport with the interest of creditors as well as with public policy and, 
accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1123(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  C. The Assumption and Rejection of Executory 
   Contracts and Unexpired Lease Provided for  
   Under the Plan is Authorized by Section 1123(b)(2) 
   and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code             
 
  Section 1123(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code provides: 
  Subject to subsection (a) of this section, a plan may -- 
 *  *  *  
   (2) subject to section 365 of this title, provide for the assumption [or] rejection ... of 
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor not previously rejected under 
such section . . . . 
  Under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may assume an executory 
contract or unexpired lease if: (i) outstanding defaults under the contract or lease have been cured 
under section 365(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code and (ii) the debtor's decision to assume such 
executory contract or unexpired lease is supported by a valid business justification.  Similarly, the 
debtor may reject an executory contract or an unexpired lease if the decision to reject is supported by 
its sound business judgment.  See, In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 25 (2d Cir. 1996); Orion 
Pictures Corp. v. Showtime Networks, Inc. (In re Orion Pictures Corp.), 4 F.3d 1095, 1089-99 (2d 
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Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 1026 (1994); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re Minges), 602 
F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Child World, Inc., 142 B.R. 87, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re 
RLR Celestial Homes, Inc., 108 B.R. 36, 46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
  In the instant case, the Plan constitutes a motion by the Debtors’ to assume, as of the 
Confirmation Date, all executory contracts and unexpired leases to which the Debtors’ are party, 
except for those executory contracts or unexpired leases that have been expressly rejected on or 
before the Confirmation Date or are the subject of a pending motion to reject on the Confirmation 
Date.   
  The Debtors’ decisions regarding the assumption and rejection of the executory 
contracts and unexpired leases are based on, and are within, the sound business judgment of the 
Debtors, are necessary to the implementation of the Plan, and are in the best interests of the Debtors’, 
their estates, and their creditors.  Accordingly, the requirements of section 1123(b)(2) and section 
365 of the Bankruptcy Code have been satisfied. 
 II. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
  Sections 1129(a)(2)-(13) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  A. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a plan proponent "comply 
with the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code".  The legislative history of section 
1129(a)(2) explains that this provision incorporates the disclosure and solicitation requirements of 
sections 1125 and 1126 of the Bankruptcy Code.  S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1978).  
See, In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 630; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 412 (1977). 
  The Debtors’ as the co-proponents of the Plan, have complied with all of the 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure governing notice, 
disclosure and solicitation of the Plan. 
  The Debtors’ have filed with the clerk of the bankruptcy court its schedule of assets 
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and liabilities, and required monthly operating reports in the format promulgated by the United States 
Trustee.  Griff Aff. ¶11.  The Debtors’ have provided good and sufficient notice of the 
Confirmation Hearing in accordance with the Disclosure Statement Order.  The solicitation of votes 
from holders of Claims in the Voting Class was made only after the approval of the Disclosure 
Statement and was made in good faith and in compliance with the applicable provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.  The ballots of holders of Claims 
in the Voting Classes were properly solicited and tabulated. 
  The Debtors’ have complied with all orders of this Court and have fulfilled their 
obligations and duties owed to creditors.  Accordingly, the Debtors’ have satisfied the requirements 
of section 1129(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  B. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that a plan be "proposed in good 
faith and not by any means forbidden by law".  The Second Circuit has construed the good faith 
provision to require a showing that the "plan was proposed with 'honesty and good intentions' and 
with 'a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected'".  Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 
843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Best Products Co., 168 B.R. 35, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), 
appeal dismissed, 177 B.R. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 68 F.3d 26 (2d Cir. 1995).  Generally, a plan 
is proposed in good faith "if there is a likelihood that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the 
standards prescribed under the code".  In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 907 (S.D.N.Y, 1988); In re 
Cellular Info. System, Inc., 171 B.R. 926 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
  The Plan is based upon extensive arms-length negotiations between the Debtors, the 
Committee, certain of the Debtors’ insurers, and other parties-in-interest.  The fact that the Plan has 
been accepted by the holders of Claims in each of the Voting Classes with creditors casting ballots, 
demonstrates the informed decision of the holders of Claims and that the Plan is in their best interest 
and maximizes distributions available to them. 
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  Finally, the Plan has been proposed with the legitimate and honest purpose of 
reorganizing the Debtors’ business and providing for a fair resolution of the outstanding sexual abuse 
claims which will afford the Debtors’ the benefit of a discharge and the ability to continue their 
mission of educating youth consistent with the tenets of the Catholic Church and providing other 
services to the needy.   Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the requirements of section 1129(a)(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
  C. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that payments for services or for 
costs and expenses in or in connection with the plan and incident to the case, have either been 
approved, or are subject to approval, by this Court as reasonable.  This section has been construed to 
require that all payments of professional fees which are made from estate assets be subject to 
bankruptcy court review and approval as to their reasonableness.  See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville 
Corp., 68 B.R. at 632. 
  Section IV of the Plan provides for a procedure for this Court to hear and determine 
all applications for allowance of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement of expenses 
incurred by the professionals out of or related to this chapter 11 case.  Payments to all professionals 
will be subject to review and approval by this Court upon final application under sections 327, 328, 
330, 503(b) or 1103 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Accordingly, the Plan complies with the requirements 
of section 1129(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  D. The Requirements of Section 1129(a)(5) of 
   the Bankruptcy Code Have Been Satisfied   
 
  Section 1129(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that: (i) the plan proponent 
disclose the identity and affiliations of the proposed officers and directors of the reorganized debtor or 
any successor to the original debtor, (ii) the appointment of such officers and directors be consistent 
with the interests of creditors and equity security holders and with public policy, and (iii) the plan 
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proponent disclose the identity and compensation of any insiders to be retained or employed by the 
reorganized debtor. 
  In accordance with section 1129(a)(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Disclosure 
Statement provides that the Debtors’ current boards of trustees will continue to serve after the 
Effective Date.  See Griff Aff. ¶ 14. 
  E. Section 1129(a)(6) of the  
   Bankruptcy Code is Not Applicable 
 
  Section 1129(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that any governmental regulatory 
commission having jurisdiction over the rates changed by the reorganized debtor in the operation of 
its business approve any rate change provided for in the plan.  The Plan does not provide for any 
changes in the rates that require regulatory approval by any governmental agency.  Griff Aff. ¶15. 
  F. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that: 
 
"with respect to each impaired class of claims or interests -- 
 
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class --  
 
(i) has accepted the plan; or 
 
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or 
interest property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is 
not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or retain if 
the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date. . .  
 
  Section 1129(a)(7) is commonly known as the "best interest of creditors test".  This 
test concerns individual creditors and equity interest holders rather than classes of claims and equity 
interests.  See, In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Corp., Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 761 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1992). 
  Under the "best interest of creditors test", this Court must find that, with respect to 
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each impaired class, each holder of an Allowed Claim in the Class has either accepted the Plan or will 
receive under the Plan property of a value, as of the Effective Date, that is not less than the amount the 
holder would receive or retain if the Debtors’ were liquidated under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  See, In re Best Products Co., 168 B.R. at 72; In re Fur Creations by Variale, 188 B.R. 754, 
759 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
  As demonstrated in the Liquidation Analysis annexed to the Disclosure Statement as 
Exhibit "C", and as further detailed in ¶ 16 of the Griffith Affidavit, the members of each of Classes 4, 
5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 will receive at least as much under the Plan as they would under a chapter 7 
liquidation.  Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the "best interest of creditors test" under section 
1129(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  G. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  The Plan satisfies the requirements of all subsections of Section 1129(a)(9) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
  Section 1129(a)(9) states that "except to the extent that a holder of a particular claim 
has agreed to a different treatment of such claim, the plan provides that . . . ".   
  With respect to administrative claims (§507(a)(2)), such Claims may not be paid in 
full on the Effective Date.  However, certain professionals have agreed to a payment arrangement 
with the Reorganized Debtors of the professional fees awarded by this Court.  In this regard, Section 
IV of the Plan provides that each holder of an Administrative Claim shall be paid by the Debtors (a) 
upon the later of the Effective Date, the date upon which the court enters a final order allowing such 
administrative claim or (b) upon such other terms as may exist in accordance with the ordinary course 
of business of the Debtor or (c) as may be agreed between any holder of such Administrative Claim 
and the Debtors. 
  With respect to the Claims described in §1129(a)(9)(C) of the Bankruptcy Code 
(Priority Tax Claims), Article IV of the Plan provides that the holders of such Claims will be paid in 
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full over on the Effective Date unless otherwise agreed in writing.   
  H. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the affirmative acceptance of a 
plan by at least one class of impaired claims, "determined without including any acceptance of the 
plan by any insider".  The Plan satisfies Section 1129(a)(10) because class 4 (sexual abuse claims) 
which does not contain any insiders voted to accept the Plan.  Therefore, the Plan satisfies the 
requirements of section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  I. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code requires this Court to find that: 
"confirmation of the plan is not likely to be followed by the 
liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization of the 
debtor or any successor to the debtor under the plan, unless such 
liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan". 
  Section 1129(a)(11) of the Bankruptcy Code is often referred to as the "feasibility 
test".  The "feasibility test" requires this Court to make an independent determination as to whether 
the Plan is workable and has a reasonable likelihood of success.  See, In re Woodmere Invs. Ltd., 
Partnership, 178 B.R. 346, 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); In re 8315 Fourth Ave. Corp., 172 B.R. 725, 
734-735 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).  As noted in Collier, a guarantee of success is not required: 
“Basically, feasibility involves the question of the emergence of the 
reorganized debtor in a solvent condition with reasonable prospects of 
financial stability and success.  It is not necessary that success be 
guaranteed, but only that the plan present a workable scheme of 
organization and operation from which there may be a reasonable 
expectation of success.” 
 
5.L. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶1129.02, at 1129-61.11 (15th ed. 1996).  See, also, In re U.S. 
Truck Co., 47 B.R. 932, 944 (E.D. Mich. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986) ("feasibility does 
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not, nor can it require the certainty that a reorganized company will succeed"). 
  The principal element of feasibility is whether there exists a reasonable probability 
that the provisions of the plan can be performed.  The court in In re Clarkson, 767 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 
1985), stated: 
"The Second Circuit has declared that the feasibility test contemplates 
'the probability of actual performance of the provisions of the plan'. . . 
The test is whether the things which are to be done after confirmation 
can be done as a practical matter. . .  
 
Id. at 420 (citing Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 585 F.2d 
1171, 1179 (2d Cir. 1978)).  See, also, In re Greene, 57 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
  To establish the feasibility of a reorganization plan, the debtor must present proof 
through reasonable projections that there will be sufficient cash flow to fund the plan and maintain 
operations according to the plan, and such projections cannot be speculative, conjectural or 
unrealistic.  Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Air, Inc., 175 B.R. 438, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Ridgewood 
Apartments of DeKalb County, Ltd., 183 B.R. 784 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995); In re Leslie Fay 
Companies, Inc., 207 B.R. 764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997).  However, a plan proponent asserting plan 
feasibility need only demonstrate that there exists a reasonable probability that the plan provisions 
can be performed.  In re Cellular Info. Systems, Inc., 171 B.R. at 945 (citing In re Drexel Burnham 
Lambert Group, Inc., 138 B.R. 723, 762 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).  Several courts have held that the 
"feasibility test" requires a bankruptcy court to find that it is more likely than not that the plan 
provisions can be performed.  See, In re Consul Restaurant Corp., 146 B.R. 979, 984 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 1992).   
  Here, Plan feasibility is easily satisfied by the fact that the Debtors’ have on hand in 
their attorneys escrow account the monies required to fund their portion of the monies to be 
contributed to the Trust.  Griff Aff. ¶ 20.  In addition, the Debtors’ have resources available to pay 
the remainder of the funds necessary to satisfy any and all professional fees awarded by this Court 
which have not been agreed to be deferred.  See, Griff Aff. ¶ 18.  In short, all of the transactions 
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necessary for the Plan to go effective are events which are capable of being satisfied without any 
contingencies, and all of which are events which can take place on the Effective Date or as otherwise 
required by the Plan, such as with respect to the sale of certain real estate. 
  J. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
   Section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code requires that either all fees payable 
under 28 U.S.C. §1930 have been paid or that the plan provides for the payment of all such fees on the 
effective date of the Plan.  As will be demonstrated at the confirmation hearing, all fees have been 
paid and will continue to be paid until a final decree is issued.  Accordingly, the Plan satisfies the 
requirements of section 1129(a)(12) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
  K. Section 1129(a)(13) of the 
   Bankruptcy Code is Not Applicable 
 
  Section 1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a plan shall provide for the 
"continuation after its effective date of payment of all retiree benefits, as that term is defined in 
section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code...for the duration of the period the debtor has obligated itself to 
provide such benefits". 
  As stated in the Griffith Affidavit, the Debtor does not and did not immediately prior 
to the commencement of this proceeding provide any retiree benefits, as such term is defined in 
section 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Griff Aff. ¶ 23.  However, the Debtors note that the Plan 
does provide in Section 6.4 that the Community Support Corporation will assume all liability for the 
support of the Debtors’ brothers after the Effective Date.  Accordingly, the provisions of section 
1129(a)(13) of the Bankruptcy Code are not applicable to the Plan or have been satisfied. 
 III. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
  Sections 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth certain requirements with respect 
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to confirmation of a plan of reorganization in the absence of unanimous class acceptance.  Section 
1129(b) is often referred to as "cram down". 
  Section 1129(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that: 
"if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section 
other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on 
request of the proponent of the plan shall confirm the plan 
notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if the plan does 
not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to 
each class of claims or interests that it impaired under, and has not 
accepted, the plan. 
  As set forth above, the Plan satisfies each of the applicable requirements of section 
1129(a).  However, because classes 9 and 10 of the Plan are not receiving or retaining any property 
on account of their Claims or Interests, they are deemed to have rejected the Plan under section 
1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Even though classes 9 and 10 do not oppose confirmation, section 
1129(b) may very well be applicable.  See, In re Waterways Barge Partnership, 104 B.R. 776 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1989); In re Higgins Slacks Co., 178 B.R. 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995).  
However, as set forth below, the Plan does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable to 
classes 9 and 10.  Similarly, since no creditors holding Claims in Classes 5 or 6 cast ballots for or 
against the Plan, confirmation under section 1129(b) may be necessary with respect to these Classes 
as well. 
  The Plan is fair and equitable with respect to Class 9 and 10 and does not discriminate 
unfairly against such Classes of Claims.  Class 9 consists of penalty claims such as claims for 
punitive damages related to sexual abuse claims.  At best, these claims constitute unsecured claims.  
Similarly, Class 10 consists of contingent reimbursement and/or indemnity claims which are 
disallowed as a matter of law under Section 502(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Similarly, the 
Plan is fair and equitable with respect to Classes 5 and 6 which consists of holders of unsecured 
Claims.  For the purpose of section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a plan is "fair and equitable" 
if: 
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(B) with respect to a Class of unsecured Claims - -    
 
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on 
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of 
the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or 
 
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not 
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or 
interest any property… 
 
  There is no class junior to unsecured creditors under the Plan.  The Debtors are New 
York and Illinois not-for-profit corporations which have no shareholders.  In Matter of Wabash 
Valley Power Association, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 965, 136 L. Ed. 2d 
305, 117 S. Ct. 389 (1996), the Seventh Circuit held that the absolute priority rule is not applicable to 
nonprofit organizations because chapter 11 is “primarily designed” for profit seeking enterprises.  In 
Wabash, the Seventh Circuit cited with approval In re Whittaker Memorial Hospital Ass’n., 149 B.R. 
812 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993), for the proposition that the retention and control of a not-for-profit 
hospital by the same individuals who controlled it prior to bankruptcy did not violate the absolute 
priority rule.  Similarly here, the fact that the Debtors’ trustees will continue in management and 
control after confirmation of the Plan, does not amount to a junior interest retaining any property as 
the Debtors’ trustees have no property interest in the Reorganized Debtors.  As such, the Plan is fair 
and equitable with respect to Classes 5, 6, 9, and 10.  The Plan does not unfairly discriminate against 
Classes 5, 6, 9, and 10 as there is a rational justification for their treatment under the Plan and such 
Classes have not voiced an objection to their treatment under the Plan.  See, In re Sacred Heart 
Hospital of Norristown, 182 B.R. 413, 422 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). 
  In summary, the Plan satisfies all of the requirements of section 1129 of the 
Bankruptcy Code because it (i) satisfies each of the provisions of section 1129(a), other than arguably 
section 1129(a)(8), (ii) does not unfairly discriminate against the holders of Claims in Classes 5, 6, 9, 
and 10, and (iii) is fair and equitable with respect to holders of Claims in Classes 5, 6, 9, and 10. 
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 IV. The Plan Satisfies the Requirements of 
  Sections 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 
 
  Section 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Section, on request of a 
party-in-interest that is a governmental unit, the court may not confirm 
a plan if the principal purpose of the plan is the avoidance of taxes or 
the avoidance of the application of section 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933 (15 U.S.C. §778).  In any hearing under this subsection, the 
governmental unit has the burden of proof on this issue of avoidance. 
  In compliance with section 1129(d), the principal purpose of the Plan is not the 
avoidance of taxes or the avoidance of the requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, as 
amended, and there has been no objection filed by any governmental unit alleging such avoidance.  
Accordingly, the requirements of section 1129(d) of the Bankruptcy Code have been satisfied. 
 
 V. The Third-Party Injunctive Relief Granted  in Section XV  
  of the Plan Comports with Case Law in This  
  Circuit and Should be Approved as an Integral Component of the Plan 
 
 Sections 15.7 through 15.13 of the Plan contain various injunctions which prohibit various 
non-debtor third parties from taking any action to recover on their claims against other non-debtor 
third parties, such as Settling Insurers and/or Participating Parties.  In the Second Circuit, a 
bankruptcy court in “unusual circumstances” may enjoin a creditor from suing a third party, provided 
the injunction plays an important part of the debtor’s reorganization plan.  In re Metromedia Fiber 
Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136 (2nd Cir. 2005).  In Metromedia, the Second Circuit observed that 
non-debtor releases are proper only in “rare cases.”  Here, the Debtors submit that these cases are 
precisely the type of rare cases the Second Circuit was referring to in Metromedia.  Although the 
Second Circuit indicated that there is no one factor or prongs for a bankruptcy court to consider in 
determining whether non-debtor releases are appropriate, the Court did provide certain examples 
such as (i) when the estate receives substantial consideration; (ii) the enjoined claims were channeled 
to a settlement fund rather than extinguished; and (iii) creditors voted in favor of the non-debtor 
11-22820-rdd    Doc 646    Filed 01/06/14    Entered 01/06/14 12:44:26    Main Document  
    Pg 19 of 32
 {Client/001718/BANK376/00718791.DOCX;6 } 20 
releases.  The Second Circuit also specifically cited with approval the Dow Corning bankruptcy case 
which involved mass torts, which is analogous to the Debtors’ chapter 11 cases. 
  Under the relevant provisions in Section XV of the Plan, the potential third-party 
claims are being channeled to the Trust.  In addition, the Settling Insurers (at this time there is only 
one approved Settling Insurer) are providing substantial consideration.  PW is paying $3.2 million 
which is approximately twenty percent of the initial cash contribution to the Trust.  Additionally, the 
ballots sent to creditors specifically contained the language granting the injunctive relief in favor of 
the Settling Insurers and the Participating Parties.  As Judge Gerber held in Adelphi 
Communications Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 268 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), citing to Metromedia as well as 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Specialty Equipment Co., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993), a 
vote in favor of a plan can constitute consent to the non-debtor releases.  See also, In re Calpine 
Corp., Case No. 05-60200, 2007 WL 4565223, at *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2007) (holders of 
claims…who (i) voted in favor of the plan or (ii) abstained from voting receive adequate notice of the 
third party releases in the plan and therefore were bound by such releases, absent an affirmative 
election to opt out of such releases).  Finally, courts in this district have approved non-debtor 
releases where such releases are a “critical component” of a settlement embodied in a plan.  See, In 
re Spiegel Inc., Case No. 03-11540 (BRL) 2006 WL 2577825 *7-8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2006) 
  The Debtors submit that the narrowly tailored third-party injunctive relief provided in 
Section XV of the Plan is consistent with the above cited case law and should be approved.  The 
claims of third parties against Settling Insurers and Participating Parties are channeled to the Trust.  
Substantial consideration has been provided which absent a settlement under the Plan would not have 
been achievable.  Creditors who are affected by the third-party releases, overwhelmingly voted in 
favor of the Plan.  In fact, not one single vote was received rejecting the Plan.  Finally, other courts 
in mass tort bankruptcy cases have granted similar relief to insurers and/or other third parties which 
are necessary for a global resolution of significant liabilities against debtors and co-liable parties.  
See, In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d at 212-13 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
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 VI. Debtors’ Reply To Plan Confirmation Objections 
 
   A. Pacific Indemnity Company (Docket No. 630)(“Pacific 
Objection”):  Pacific objects to the Plan on the basis that the Plan is not insurance neutral, the Plan 
impermissibly assigns certain insurance rights to the Trust and the Court does not have the 
Constitutional authority to rule on the proposed assignment because there is no “case or controversy” 
to adjudicate and the Court is constrained by Stern v. Marshall, 541 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2594 (2011) 
(“Stern”) from entering a final order confirming the Plan which approves the assignment of Pacific’s 
insurance policies to the Trust.  Several other insurance carriers (Interstate Fire & Casualty 
Company (Docket No. 632), Maryland Casualty Company (Docket No. 638) and Hanover Insurance 
Company and Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company (Docket No. 640))(collectively, the “Other 
Carriers”) have filed objections that join in the Pacific Objection.  None of the Other Carriers have 
submitted any points or authorities to supplement those submitted by Pacific.  Therefore, the Debtors 
response to Pacific’s Objection is applicable to the objections of the Other Carriers. 
    i. Jurisdiction:  This Court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether the insurance assignment provisions of the Plan (Sections 11.1 and 11.2) are valid and do not 
defeat or impair the Insurance Coverage.  A “case or controversy” exists because the Plan seeks the 
Court’s determination that the assignment provisions do not defeat or impair the Insurance Coverage 
and Pacific contends that they are invalid and do defeat or impair the Insurance Coverage.  See 
Pacific Objection, IV.D (“The Proposed Assignment Violates Both Non-Bankruptcy and Bankruptcy 
Law”).  Pacific makes the conclusory statement that there is no case or controversy but does not 
provide any authority for why Plan Sections 11.1, 11.2, the Pacific Objection and the Other Carriers’ 
objections do not constitute a controversy.  
  Stern does not limit this Court’s jurisdiction to determine the validity of the insurance 
assignments because the Court has specific power under Sections 1123(a)(5)(B) and 1123(b)(3)(B) to 
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transfer the Debtors’ property (e.g. the insurance policies) and to appoint the Trustee as a 
representative of the estate, all in connection with confirmation of a plan.  Confirmation of a plan of 
reorganization is a core, if not primary, goal of Chapter 11 and the tools that enable a debtor to 
propose a meaningful plan include assertion of the transfer and appointment powers ensconced in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The transfer and assignment power therefore involve a ‘public right” that this 
Court can adjudicate, even in the context of private contractual rights. In re Refco Inc., 461 B.R. 181, 
187 -188 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)(Stern does not preclude a final bankruptcy court judgment relying 
on authority that flows from a federal scheme and that enables bankruptcy judge to manage 
bankruptcy process, including confirmation of plan).  In In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 
355, 374 (3rd Cir. 2012), the Third Circuit held that the word “notwithstanding” in Section 1123(a) of 
the Bankruptcy Code showed a clear congressional intent to allow the transfer of rights under private 
contracts.  The Court stated: 
“The plain language of § 1123(a) evinces clear congressional intent 
for a preemptive scope that includes the transactions listed under § 
1123(a)(5) as ‘adequate means’ for the plan’s implementation, 
including the transfer of property authorized by 1123(a)(5)(B).  The 
plain language also reaches private contracts enforced by state 
common law, and overcomes the presumption against preemption.” 
 
684 F.3d 374 
 
  The Third Circuit also touched upon certain policy considerations that further support 
the assignment of insurance policies to a trust as part of the settlement of a mass tort bankruptcy.  
Specifically, the Court noted that assignment to a personal injury trust did not impose a greater risk on 
insurers than that which they had originally bargained for.  As noted below, the Plan Proponents 
have modified Sections 11.1 and 11.2 of the Plan to add additional limits on the scope of the 
assignment of insurance obligations.  The Pacific Objection fails to even cite or discuss the Third 
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Circuit’s exhaustive opinion in Federal Mogul which was decided after Stern.   
 Pacific seems to confuse the issue of the validity of the insurance assignments, which clearly 
flow from a federal regulatory scheme, e.g. the Bankruptcy Code, and the resolution of the pending 
coverage action.  This Court is not being asked to make any determination on coverage as part of the 
Plan confirmation process, rather, this Court is just authorizing and approving the assignment of 
whatever rights the Debtors have under the insurance policies as an adequate means for the Plan’s 
implementation as required under Section 1123(a) and specifically authorized pursuant to Section 
1123(a)(5)(B).  The coverage action will proceed subject to all of the defenses raised and reserved by 
Pacific, as well as the Other Carriers, such as Hanover, which has commenced an adversary 
proceeding seeking to deny coverage. 
ii. Debtors’ Assignment of Insurance Rights to the Trust Without 
Insurer Consent is Permissible Pursuant to Both 
Non-Bankruptcy and Bankruptcy Law, State Law in Each 
Applicable State Allows the Assignment of Insurance Rights 
For Losses that Have Occurred Prior to the Assignment  
  Pacific contends that the Plan is unconfirmable because it provides for an assignment 
of the Debtors’ rights and obligations under its Insurance Policies to the Trust. Pacific’s objections to 
the assignment and appointment of the Trustee as Estate Representative are without merit.  
  Although Pacific concedes that “[s]ome cases do hold that the assignment of 
insurance policy benefits for losses that have accrued prior to the time of the transfer is permissible 
under non-bankruptcy law,” its concession understates the extent to which virtually all states allow 
such assignments without insurer consent.  According to Couch on Insurance: 
Although there is some authority to the contrary [citing only Tyler v. National 
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 48 Ga. App. 338, 172 S.E. 747 (1934)], the great 
majority of courts adhere to the rule that general stipulations in policies 
prohibiting assignments of the policy, except with the consent of the insurer, 
apply only to assignments before loss, and do not prevent an assignment after 
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loss, for the obvious reason that the clause by its own terms ordinarily prohibits 
merely the assignment of the policy, as distinguished from a claim arising under 
the policy, and the assignment before loss involves a transfer of a contractual 
relationship while the assignment after loss is the transfer of a right to a money 
claim. The purpose of a no assignment clause is to protect the insurer from 
increased liability, and after events giving rise to the insurer's liability have 
occurred, the insurer's risk cannot be increased by a change in the insured's 
identity.  
§35.8, Couch on Insurance, 3rd Edition (2013)   
 
  It is noteworthy that Pacific fails to cite to any case applying state law that it asserts 
would be applicable to the Insurance Policies at issue in the Pacific Objection, which does not 
adhere to the above rule.  Pacific issued insurance policies to Seattle Archdiocese and to the 
Congregation of Christian Brothers for risks at specified locations in Washington State.  
Washington State law allows assignments of policy rights for covered events that have already 
occurred, notwithstanding any policy provision requiring consent for such assignments. The 
Supreme Court of Washington, in Public Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Int’l Ins. Co., 124 Wn.2d 789, 
800-801; 881 P.2d 1020, 1027 (1994), held that: 
The purpose of a no-assignment clause in an insurance contract is to protect the 
insurer from increased liability. After the events giving rise to the insurer’s 
liability have occurred, the insurer’s risk cannot be increased by a change in the 
insured’s identity. The assignments in this case occurred long after the activities 
giving rise to liability. 
  
Two Washington appellate court cases support the assertion that assignments 
after a loss are valid.  See, Kiecker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 5 Wn. App 871, 877, 
491 P.2d 244 (1971) (After a loss has occurred and rights under the policy have 
accrued, an assignment may be made without the consent of the insurer, even 
though the policy prohibits assignments.); Kagele v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co.,  
40 Wn. App. 194, 197, 698 P.2d 90 (It is well established that a claim by an 
insured against his insurer may be assigned to the injured party.), review 
denied, 103 Wn.2d 1042 (1985). 
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Id. 
  Likewise, Illinois (the location of Debtor CBOI) law allows the assignment of 
policy rights without insurer consent after a covered loss has occurred: 
Once a covered loss has occurred, the insured's assignment of its right to liability 
coverage or a defense relating to those losses does not require consent from the 
insurer because the assignment is essentially the assignment of payment of a 
claim already accrued, a claim consisting of the right to a defense and 
indemnification. 
Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Commerce and Industry Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App (1st) 093084, 962 N.E. 
1042, 1053 (2011).  
  Pacific concedes that New York (the location of Debtor CBI) law similarly holds “that 
the assignment of insurance policy benefits for losses that have accrued prior to the time of the 
transfer is permissible under non-bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Globecon Group, LLC v. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co., 434 F.3d 165 (2nd Cir. 2006).”  
Pacific Objection at ¶14. 
iii. Debtors’ Assignment of Certain Limited Obligations to the 
Trust is Permissible 
 
  Pacific also contends that the Plan is unconfirmable because it provides in Section 
11.2 for an assignment of Debtors’ obligations under its Insurance Policies to the Trust.  However, 
Pacific concedes that the Debtors are not being relieved of their obligations under the policies which 
concession in itself should be the basis for overruling the objection (Pacific Objection at ¶13).  
Regardless, in an attempt to reach an amicable resolution, counsel for Pacific, Debtors and the 
Committee have been negotiating changes to the Plan to address Pacific’s concerns. In that regard, 
Debtors and the Committee have proposed to modify the language of Sections 11.1 and 11.2 to clarify 
that the only obligations being transferred to the Trust are narrowly limited to those that “are 
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necessary, if any, to enforce such assigned rights to Insurance Claims and Insurance Recoveries 
against the Non-Settling Insurers.”  Moreover, those proposed sections continue to provide, as 
they did in the First Amended Plan, that the Debtors maintain their responsibility for their 
obligations under the policies: “provided, however, that the Trust’s assumption of such 
responsibility shall not relieve the Debtors, the Reorganized Debtors or the Participating Parties 
from any obligation that such entities may have under the Insurance Policies.” In addition, Section 
11.7 of the First Amended Plan expressly provides that the Reorganized Debtors will be required 
to meet their obligations pursuant to a defending Non-Settling Insurer’s policy’s cooperation 
clause. Section 11.7 provides that Reorganized Debtors will “cooperate, in accordance with the 
terms of any applicable Insurance Policy, with a Non-Settling Insurer that is providing a defense to 
such a Claim.” Further, Section 11.7 helps to ensure such cooperation by providing that the Trust 
will pay for “out of pocket costs, including attorneys’ fees incurred by the Reorganized Debtors as 
a consequence of such cooperation.”  
  Pursuant to the amended Sections 11.1 and 11. 2, along with Section 11.7, the Plan 
provides that the Debtors and Reorganized Debtors maintain responsibility for their obligations 
under the Insurance Policies. Moreover, because the Plan preserves all of the insurers’ 
defenses to coverage (other than any based on the assignment of insurance rights or appointment 
of the Trustee to enforce such rights), if those obligations are not met, Insurers maintain all their 
non-bankruptcy law rights in that regard, which they had prior to the assignment to the Trust. 
iv. Even if State Law Prohibited the Plan’s Assignment and 
Appointment of the Trustee as Estate Representative, Sections 
541(c) and 1123 Preempt Any Such State Law.   
  The conclusion that Sections 541(c) and 1123 apply to insurance policies and are 
preemptive of state law is nearly hornbook law.  Pacific does not even address preemption and fails 
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to inform the Court that the Ninth Circuit has ruled that Pacific’s own cited authority, Henkel Corp., 
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 62 P.3d 69 (Cal. 2003), is inapplicable in a bankruptcy 
context.  In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869, 889 (9th Cir. 2012).  See also, In re 
Federal-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 374 (3rd Cir. 2012); In re Combusion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 
190, 219 (3d Cir. 2004); In re St. Clare’s Hosp. and Health Center, 934 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 
1991)(insurance policies are property of the estate); In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance 
Litigation, 499 B.R. 310, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)(citing Integrated Solutions, Inc. v. Svc. Support 
Specialties, Inc., 124 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir.1997) for proposition that Congress intended preemption 
under Sections 541(c) and 1123) and In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 343 B.R. 88 (D.Del. 
2006)(non-asbestos case). 
 v. The Plan is Insurance Neutral 
  Pacific complains that the Plan is not “insurance neutral” and that, therefore, the Plan 
is not confirmable. As a threshold matter, Pacific cites to no case that holds that a Plan must be 
insurance neutral in order to be confirmed; its cases merely deal with an insurer’s standing to object 
to a plan. In any event, the Plan is insurance neutral because it imposes no additional obligations on 
insurers, does not alter any insurance policy, makes no determinations as to insurance coverage, does 
not purport to bind insurers to any determinations of liability or damages and preserves all of the 
Non-Settling Insurer’s coverage defenses, other than the defense that the assignment of policy rights 
or the appointment of the Trustee to enforce such rights voids or reduces insurance coverage. As set 
forth above, it is well established that the enforceability of policy provisions that restrict such rights 
preempted by bankruptcy law and, thus, do not render the Plan unconfirmable.   
  Despite claiming that the existing insurance neutrality provision comes up “woefully 
short” and providing its own proposed terms, Pacific has done little to elucidate the claimed 
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shortcomings of the existing insurance neutrality provision in the context of the First Amended Plan. 
However, as Pacific has indicated, Debtors and the Committee have been working with Pacific and 
certain other insurers’ counsel over a period of several weeks to address their concerns about the 
Plan’s insurance neutrality. Debtors and the Committee have explained to Pacific and other insurers’ 
counsel that Pacific’s proposed insurance neutrality provisions go beyond insurance neutrality and 
contain language and provisions that are inconsistent with the Plan. However, as noted, Debtors’ and 
the Committee’s counsel have been working together to develop mutually acceptable insurance 
neutrality language, including lengthy conference calls on January 2nd and 3rd.  As a result, the 
Committee’s and Debtors’ counsel provided Pacific’s and certain other insurers’ counsel with revised 
insurance neutrality provisions and a judgment reduction provision that they believe addressed 
Pacific’s concerns, late on January 3, 2014 and on January 5th.  A copy of those revised provisions 
are attached hereto as Exhibit A.  If Pacific agrees to the proposed insurance neutrality and 
judgment reduction provisions then, of course, this part of the Pacific Objection is moot.  If Pacific 
does not agree, the Debtors submit that the proposed insurance neutrality and judgment reduction 
provisions are more than adequate to meet the threshold of insurance neutrality.  
  The proposed provisions provide that nothing in the Plan, Confirmation Order or in 
any Plan Document modifies any of the terms of any Insurance Policy (11.7.1) and preserves all of 
insurers’ defenses to any Insurance Claim, except to the extent that insurers assert a defense based 
on the assignment of policy rights or the appointment of the Trustee to enforce such rights (11.7.5). 
As requested by Pacific, the proposed provisions provide that neither the liquidation and payment 
of claims by the Trust nor the review by the Abuse Claims Reviewer constitute a trial, an 
adjudication on the merits or evidence of liability or damages in any litigation with Reorganized 
Debtors or Non-Settling Insurers or constitute a determination of the reasonableness of the amount 
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of any Abuse Claim, either individually or in the aggregate with other Abuse Claims, in any 
litigation of Insurance Claims with any Non-Settling Insurers. (11.7.4). The proposed provisions 
provide that nothing in the Plan, Confirmation Order or in any Plan Document imposes any 
additional obligations on an insurer and that its obligations are determined in accordance with the 
policy terms and applicable non-bankruptcy law (11.7.6). Likewise, they do not provide any claimant 
a right to directly sue an insurer. (11.7.7). Further, the proposed provisions specify that there is no 
determination that anyone is an insured under any insurance policy or that any insurer owes any duty 
to defend or indemnify anyone with respect to any Claim (11.7.8).  The proposed provisions also 
preserve the Reorganized Debtors’ defenses to any Claim and the right of any defending Non-Settling 
Insurer to assert such underlying defenses (11.7.9). The proposed revisions also consolidate other 
provisions of the Plan that preserve the Debtors’ insurance rights (11.7.2 and 11.7.3). Finally, the 
proposed provisions add a judgment reduction provision as Section 11.8. That section provides a 
judgment reduction mechanism in the event that any insurer obtains a judicial determination or 
binding arbitration award that, but for the channeling injunction in Section 15.10 of the Plan, it 
would be entitled to obtain a sum certain from a Settling Insurer as a result of a claim for 
contribution, subrogation, indemnification, or other similar claim against a Settling Insurer. 
  In short, the First Amended Plan was already insurance neutral. The proposed 
insurance neutrality and judgment reduction provisions further ensure that the Plan is insurance 
neutral.  
   B. Canandaigua National Bank and Trust (Docket No. 634):  
Canandaigua National Bank and Trust, a Class 2 secured creditor, objected to the Plan to ensure that 
the Plan does not impair its right to receive postpetition interest.  The Debtors believe that the Plan’s 
treatment of Class 2 creditors addresses this issue because Class 2 creditors are unimpaired.  
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Nonetheless, the Debtors will include the following provision in the confirmation order:  “The Plan 
does not alter Canandaigua National Bank and Trust’s rights regarding payment under the notes, 
mortgages and other security instruments between the Debtors and Canandaigua National Bank and 
Trust, including the right to receive post-petition interest.” 
   C. Aetna, Inc. and Certain Affiliated Entities (Docket No. 635):  
Aetna, Inc. and certain affiliated entities (“Aetna”) filed an objection to ensure that the Debtors 
continue to make payments under the Aetna Agreements and that it may assert post-assumption any 
overpayment or other claims that may arise under the Aetna Agreements relating to pre-assumption 
events.  The Debtors intend to make the payments due under the Aetna Agreements and the Debtors 
agree to Aetna’s reserved and retained rights. The Debtors will include the following provision in the 
confirmation order: “The Debtors shall make all payments due and owing to Aetna, Inc. and certain 
affiliated entities (“Aetna”) that are due and payable under those prepetition agreements with Aetna 
(“Aetna Agreements”) and, following assumption of the Aetna Agreements, Aetna retains any 
overpayment or other claims that may arise under the Aetna Agreements relating to pre-assumption 
events.”  
   D. The Corporation of The Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (Docket 
No. 637): The Corporation of The Catholic Archbishop of Seattle (“Seattle AD”) (the holder of a 
claim that is the subject of a pending objection and the holder of a contingent contribution claim that 
is disallowed by Bankruptcy Code section 502(e)(1)) objected to the Plan on two grounds:  First, that 
the Plan does not comply with applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and second, that the 
Plan has not been proposed in good faith.  Other than citations to the Bankruptcy Code, Seattle AD 
does not cite a single authority in support of its objection.  The offending provision of the Plan is the 
Debtors’ highly negotiated discharge which enables the Abuse Survivors to continue litigation 
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against the Seattle AD and other joint tortfeasors which may subject them to joint liability for sexual 
abuse.  A negotiated discharge is contemplated by Section 1141(d)(2) which provides that the 
statutory discharge may be modified by a plan or a plan confirmation order.  In the mediation before 
Judge Stong, the Committee agreed to allow the Debtors to retain certain assets in consideration for 
the negotiated discharge.  Absent this negotiated discharge, the Committee, which consisted entirely 
of Abuse Survivors (over 300 of whom have voted to accept the Plan) would not have reached a 
consensual resolution of this case and the Debtors’ ability to continue their mission and afford 
security for their retired and ailing members would have been jeopardized.   
  A debtor’s discharge is for the benefit of the debtor and not for the benefit of third 
parties.  Ordinarily, a party, such as the Seattle AD, lacks standing to assert the rights of a third party 
such as the Debtors.  See, In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 623 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(“[N]o party may successfully prevent the confirmation of a plan by raising the rights of third parties 
who do not object to confirmation.”)  Thus, the Seattle AD should not be afforded standing to object 
to the Debtors’ highly negotiated discharge.  While the Seattle AD may be in negotiation with the 
Debtors and Sexual Abuse survivors to resolve its own exposure, the Seattle AD has not cited a single 
legal authority supporting its assertion that it should be the beneficiary of the consensual resolution of 
claims between the Debtors and Sexual Abuse survivors.  The Court should only be concerned with 
whether the Debtors’ discharge provides the Debtors with sufficient protections to ensure that they 
will not require further financial reorganization and not be exposed to litigation for abuse which 
occurred prior to the chapter 11 filings.  The Debtors believe the limited carveout from the discharge 
does not interfere with the Debtors’ fresh start.   
 CONCLUSION 
  Based upon the foregoing the Debtors submit that the Plan complies with all of the 
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requirements of section 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code as well as the other applicable provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Accordingly, the Debtors respectfully requests that the Court overrule the 
objections filed to confirmation of the Plan, confirm the Plan, and grant such other and further relief 




Dated: New York, New York 
 January 6, 2014 
 
       Respectfully submitted, 
 
       Tarter Krinsky & Drogin LLP  
       Attorneys for The Christian Brothers’ Institute 
       and The Christian Brothers of Ireland Inc. 
       Debtors and Debtors-in-Possession 
   
         By:   /s/ Scott S. Markowitz    
            Scott S. Markowitz (SSM-0849) 
         1350 Broadway, 11th Floor 
            New York, New York  10018 
            (212) 216-8000 
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